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Some years ago, I published an article in which I argued
that "wealth maximization" provides an ethically attractive
norm for social and political choices, such as those made by
courts asked to determine whether negligence or strict liabil-
ity should be the rule for deciding whether an injurer must
compensate his victim.' This article gave rise to a flurry of
criticisms,2 to which I replied3 -without convincing many of
the critics." I am pleased to have this opportunity to recon-
sider my position. Perhaps as a result of my new perspective
as a judge, I find myself slightly more sympathetic to some of
the criticisms than I once was-but only slightly more.
1. WHAT IS WEALTH MAXIMIZATION AND WHERE DOES IT
COME FROM?
To most people who are not economists, the word
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"wealth" suggests money. But to an economist, it refers to
weighting preferences for the things that people want, either
by willingness to pay for a thing, if you do not own it, or by
unwillingness to part with it voluntarily, if you do own it. So,
if I am unwilling to part with my house for less than
$100,000, and no one is willing to pay more than $90,000 for
it, society's wealth is $10,000 greater than it would be if the
house were taken from me and given to the highest bidder (I
am not a bidder, because I am the owner). This would be so
even if I were paid $100,000 for the house (which would re-
quire taxation, since no one will voluntarily pay $100,000 for
it). I would be no wealthier than before, and the rest of the
community would have $100,000 less, incompletely offset by
a house worth only $90,000 to its new owner.Now suppose that I want a car and would pay $10,000
for it, and the present owner would sell it for $5,000. Soci-
ety's wealth will be increased if I am allowed to buy the car
from him for any amount between $5,000 and $10,000 (ig-
nore selling costs). Suppose the price is $7,500. After the
transaction I will have $2,500 plus a car worth $10,000 to
me. I will thus have total wealth (ignoring the house and any
other wealth I have) of $12,500, and he $7,500, for a total of
$20,000, whereas before the transaction our combined
wealth was only $15,000.
Granted, both examples ignore a fundamental prob-
lem-how it is that I initially came to have the house, and he
the car. I shall come back to that problem, but for now, I just
want to explain what wealth means.
Wealth is not limited to market commodities such as
houses and cars. As a matter of fact, the value of houses and
cars is not always reducible to market values. The house I
value at $100,000 might not be valued at more than $90,000
by anyone else because it has sentimental associations for me,
and likewise with the car. In this case, the real value would
exceed market value. Or, I might work for a lower salary
than I could make, simply because I liked the work I did for
that lower salary so much; that would mean that I derived
part of my wealth from working and part from the pecuniary
income that I earned by working.
These examples help to show that money, to an econo-
mist, is not wealth, but just a measure of one's entitlement to
houses, cars, rewarding work, leisure, privacy, and countless
other "things" that constitute a person's wealth; everyone's
wealth added together constitutes the nation's wealth. The
wealth of a nation is the present value of the flow of benefits,
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measured as suggested above, from the consumption of goods
and services, tangible and intangible, by its people. Monetary
measures of social income or wealth 5 such as Gross National
Product or National Income are inadequate and inaccurate
measures of a nation's wealth. When I used money as a com-
ponent of wealth earlier, it was just a shorthand term for the
things that money can buy.
The economist uses the concept of income or wealth in
this broad sense all the time, but calls it "utility," meaning,
however, something quite different from what utilitarian phi-
losophers mean. To compound the confusion, the economist
uses the word "wealth" to mean something different from
the economic concept of "utility." To the economist, "util-
ity" differs from "wealth" because utility is adjusted for peo-
ple's preference for risk or (more commonly) aversion to risk,
in the sense of the variance of possible outcomes of an uncer-
tain event. If you were given gratis a fifty percent chance of
winning ten dollars (and an equal chance of winning noth-
ing), your "wealth" (in the narrow economic sense) would
rise by five dollars, which is the expected utility of the chance
to someone who is risk neutral. But if you were risk averse,
the increment in your expected utility would be less than five
dollars, so you would sell the ticket to someone less risk
averse, or risk neutral, or risk preferring, if you could, and
you would thereby increase your utility. If you were risk pre-
ferring, the chance would be worth more than five dollars to
you. Thus "wealth," in my sense, is a synonym for expected
utility. Bear in mind that wealth is a function of willingness to
pay (or unwillingness to part with, but for present purposes,
the difference is unimportant). If you will pay more for the
fifty percent chance than its certain equivalent (because you
are a risk preferrer), then it is worth more to you; its ex-
pected utility determines your willingness to pay, and hence
describes the effect of the chance on your wealth. For exam-
ple, if you would pay six dollars for the chance, the gift of it
would increase your wealth by six dollars.
Wealth, in my sense, equates to utility in the economic
sense but is distinct from the utilitarian concept of utility as
happiness, however broadly (or narrowly) happiness is de-
5. "Income" is a flow concept, "wealth" the corresponding stock
concept. The important thing to bear in mind is that income (and there-
fore wealth, which is the discounted present value of anticipated future in-
come) refers to real rather than monetary phenomena-to housing or
transportation services or leisure, not to wages or dividends.
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fined, though wealth and happiness are positively correlated.
(Ask anyone whether he or she would turn down an uncondi-
tional gift of money!) I might be made deliriously happy by
being given a ticket to a Notre Dame football game, but if I
am outbid by another football fan, it means that wealth max-
imization requires that I not get the ticket, even though the
person who outbids me might derive less pleasure from the
game than I would have derived. The refusal of modern
economists to make "interpersonal comparisons of utility"
means in effect that they use wealth rather than happiness as
'the criterion for an efficient allocation of resources.
People find it easier to picture wealth maximization in
actual transactions than in potential transactions, but one of
the most important uses of the concept is in connection with
potential transactions. I refer to the analysis of the welfare
loss (in my terminology, the wealth loss) caused by monopoly.
In Figure 1, the monopolist, in order to increase his profits
over the competitive (= zero) level, reduces his output to q.,
at which level the market-clearing price is P.. Those custom-
ers who continue to buy the product at its new, monopoly
price incur a wealth loss measured by the rectangle ABCF;





0 %m 4. Quantlity
Figure I
net social loss from monopoly is the triangle BEC. This is the
consumer surplus that is lost by those who are deflected to
substitute products by the higher price, but that is not trans-
formed into producer surplus (profit). In what sense is it a
loss? At the competitive price and output, these consumers
(all but the last, represented by the intersection of D and S,
at point E) would have been willing to pay more for the prod-
uct than they were charged. In other words, the product in-
creased their wealth by more than the purchase price-as is
[Vol. 2
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still true of those consumers who continue to buy the product
at its current price. The idea of consumer (and producer)
surplus, a legacy of the great English economist Alfred Mar-
shall, shows that wealth is not money. This is the crucial in-
sight in making wealth maximization a standard of social
welfare.
The welfare loss of monopoly is the least controversial,
though no longer the only, ground on which economists de-
nounce monopoly.' This denunciation illustrates the norma-
tive use of the concept of wealth maximization, 7 and my posi-
tion in this paper amounts to nothing more than expanding
the normative domain of the concept. If you think back to
the house and car examples with which I began, you will real-
ize that they were both cases where the objective was to max-
imize surplus value-the value that measures what people are
willing to pay (or what they demand) over and above market
price, the price paid by the marginal buyer (pm' . in Figure 1).
Anyone who is inclined to say that wealth is not a value
in an ethical sense should ask himself whether he agrees that
monopolies and cartels are bad because they lead to a reduc-
tion in the value of output. If he agrees with this traditional
economic criticism, then he believes that wealth is a social,
ethical value-whether he knows it or not. He also believes
that interpersonal comparisons of wealth are possible-that
is, that it is possible to compare the loss of surplus to the con-
sumer with the gain to the monopolist. It is by such compari-
sons that one can determine whether a given transaction, pol-
icy or institution is wealth maximizing. Of course, the
information costs may be formidable, but there is no objec-
tion in principle to measuring aggregate wealth.
II. CRITICISMS
The most basic criticism of an ethic of wealth maximiza-
tion is one that I share: that you cannot deduce "ought:'
from "is"; you cannot prove, deductively or inductively, that
6. See, e.g., J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 249-52
(1984).
7. And makes quite extraordinary the assertion that wealth max-
imization requires monopoly because monopoly leads to higher prices. See
N. MERCURO & T. RYAN, supra note 4, at 132; Kornhauser, A Guide to the
Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 596-97
(1980); Coleman, supra note 2, at 523-24. This is known in the economic
literature as the Earl of Lauderdale's fallacy. See G. STIGLER, THE THEORY
OF PRICE 196-97 (3d ed. 1966).
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social decisions ought to conform to some ethical theory. The
lack of provability imparts a pervasive uncertainty to ethical
debates; it is not clear what it means to prevail in an ethical
argument. Ethical arguments do not convince doubters but
rather provide rationalizations for ethical positions taken on
emotional grounds. Indeed, more ethical arguments have
been won on the battlefield than in the lecture hall; and if
the fascist powers had won World War II, the dominant ethi-
cal views in this society would probably be different today.
Perhaps-speaking descriptively and in the long run-might
is responsible for most opinions of what is right.
My goal is therefore quite modest. I do not seek to "con-
vert" anyone to wealth maximization. I merely want to per-
suade you that it is a reasonable, though not a demonstrably
or a universally correct, ethic (I shall explain later why my
goal is so limited). But to do this I shall have to consider the
principal arguments against its being even that.
A. Asking versus Offer Prices, and the Derivation of Property
Rights
The first argument is that the idea of wealth maximiza-
tion does not tell us whether to maximize in terms of asking
or offering prices; in my example of a house, the asking price
was $100,000 but the offer price was only $90,000. I reject
this argument. The concept of wealth maximization tells us
when to use asking and when to use offer prices, pro-
vided-an important qualification to which I shall return in a
moment-that property rights have been assigned.
If the costs of voluntary transactions are low, the equilib-
rium prices, which provide the logical and natural means of
measuring wealth, will be asking prices; for whenever an of-
fer price is higher than an asking price, the offer will be ac-
cepted.' If the costs of voluntary transactions are prohibitive,
however, then offer prices9 may exceed asking prices indefi-
nitely; and if, but only if, an involuntary transaction is possi-
ble at a cost less than the difference between offer and asking
price, the offer price (that is, the hypothetical offer price)
8. At the margin, of course, the offer and asking price will be the
same; but there may be many intramarginal holders of the good or service
transacted in the market, and for them the asking prices will exceed the
offer prices and provide the correct measure of value. The house example
illustrates this point.
9. Hypothetical offer prices, that is, if transactions are prohibitively
costly, no one will bother to make offers.
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rather than the asking price will provide the correct guide
for social choices designed to maximize wealth. Suppose mil-
lions of people would be willing to pay in the aggregate $1
billion for clean air, and the polluters would be willing to
stop polluting the air for $100 million. But because there are
so many polluters and pollutants, voluntary transactions are
prohibitively costly. One way to look at this case would be to
say that clean air is not really worth $900 million (benefits
minus costs), because we have left out the transaction costs.
These transaction costs, which exceed $900 million, are just
like any other costs-like transportation costs, for exam-
ple-and, when added in, show that the clean air really has
no net value.
Transaction costs differ from transportation costs, how-
ever, because they sometimes can be circumvented by substi-
tuting a legal institution for the market as the method of allo-
cating resources. In deciding whether this is possible in a
particular case, we must have an idea of the value of an allo-
cative change without regard to transaction costs, before we
can decide whether that value exceeds the cost of the legal
institution necessary to bring about the allocation.10 If, in my
example, the institution would cost less than $900 million,
then society would be made wealthier by the legally coerced
allocation of the rights in the air to the victims of the pollu-
tion. But $900 million may be an underestimate. Recall that
asking prices can exceed offer prices. It might be that al-
though the victims of air pollution would be willing to spend
only $1 billion for cleaner air, once they had cleaner air they
might demand $2 billion to give it up. This would be the rel-
evant figure if the victims were deemed to own clear air,
rather than if the polluters owned the right to dirty the air;
and, precisely since asking and offer prices may differ," and
differ greatly, this assumption may affect the outcome of the
hypothetical transaction-an important point to which I shall
return in a moment. If the cost of abating pollution was $1.5
billion, the difference between deeming the victims the own-
ers of the right and deeming the polluters the owners of the
right would be crucial.
10. Thus the social engineer is interested in the value of a transac-
tion ex transaction costs in the same way that a transportation engineer is
interested in the value of a transaction ex transportation costs.
11. For empirical evidence, including evidence on air pollution, see
Knetsch, Legal Rules and the Basis for Evaluating Economic Losses, 4 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 5 (1984).
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But the present point is simply that, given well-defined
property rights, the question of whether wealth maximization
concerns offer prices or asking prices is a pseudo-question.
Wealth is maximized by creating a system which allows offer
and asking prices to be compared, and offers to be accepted
if, but only if, the offer price exceeds the asking price, and
which imposes acceptance if, but only if, transaction costs
make it impossible for the market to compare a (higher) offer
price with a (lower) asking price, as in the pollution example.
Because asking and offer prices may differ, it is necessary
to have a way of deciding who may charge an asking price
and who must make offers; this is a question about property
rights. For present purposes, a property right means the
right not to be divested of the use, control, and enjoyment of
a thing (tangible or intangible) at a price below one's asking
price. Once property rights are assigned, it becomes clear
who may charge asking prices and who must make offers.
Wealth maximization can then proceed through the opera-
tion of the free market, and through market surrogates
where the costs of market transactions are prohibitive and
the costs of legal transactions tolerable.
It would, of course, be possible to take the assignment of
property rights as given, and use wealth maximization to
guide the shifting of the rights through trade and substitutes
for trade. But I think one can go further and without circu-
larity, can suggest how property rights should be assigned in
the first place in order to maximize a society's wealth. And
this is not so academic an endeavor as it may seem.
In my pollution example, there is no "natural" assign-
ment of property rights over the use of the air; one could say
that people have a right to breathe clean air, and polluters
must buy that right, or equally that polluters have a right to
emit pollutants as a byproduct of their activities, and people
must buy that right (the "purchase" in either case would be
an involuntary transaction, because market transactions are
assumed to be unworkable). I do not know how to solve this
particular problem; that is, I do not know whether in deter-
mining how much pollution is optimal we should use the ask-
ing or offer prices of clean air, which may of course differ,
though presumably by little if we are talking about small
changes in the cleanliness of air. If we are talking about
whether the air shall be breathable or lethal, the difference
between asking and offer prices could be enormous, since of-
fer prices are limited by one's wealth, and asking prices may
be infinite when the asker's life is at stake. However, cases of
[Vol. 2
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this kind-where wealth maximization provides no guidance
to the initial assignment of property rights and asking and
offer prices are likely to differ greatly-are rare; they reveal
a limitation to an ethics of wealth maximization, but not a
fatal limitation.
One can say a good deal about how property rights
should be assigned in order to maximize wealth. For exam-
ple, wealth maximization does not imply assigning property
rights to whomever, regardless of his budget, gets the most
pleasure out of the property in question, though he might
have the highest asking price. 2 This approach appears to col-
lapse wealth maximization into utility maximization in the
sense used by utilitarian philosophers; worse, it actually dis-
serves wealth maximization. If property rights were assigned
on the basis of who would charge the highest asking prices,
society would soon be impoverished. The method of assign-
ment would destroy incentives to work and invest-unless
rights could be sold free of any governmental power to take
them away from their new owner; but that would depart
from a system of assigning property rights so as to maximize
utility in the utilitarian sense.
Bear in mind that wealth is a stock concept, not a flow
concept; one's wealth is the present value of the stream of
future income or other benefits generated by one's human
and physical capital. The stream would be pitifully small if
property rights were assigned and reassigned on the basis of
who derived the most pleasure from having what property.
People would cultivate the faculty of enjoyment rather than
of hard work; little producer and consumer surplus would be
created.
If you asked a random group of economists how to assign
property rights in a new society with a literate population so
as to maximize the prices (times quantities), explicit and im-
plicit ("shadow"), asking and offer, in the society, they would
almost certainly begin by giving each mentally competent
adult the property rights to his own labor.13 They would, in
short, reject slavery, an inefficient institution under modern
conditions. With unimportant exceptions, the costs of moni-
12. Might, not would, because if he also got great pleasure out of
other things, the money he could get for a given item of property might be
very valuable to him because it would enable him to buy other pleasurable
things.
13. 'I'he qualification implies, of course, the persistence of institu-
tions of quasi-slavery, as one might characterize (but for the pejorative
overtones) the condition of children and mental incompetents.
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toring the output of a slave today would be much higher than
the costs of monitoring a free man's output through contract.
Although some slave owners would be quite wealthy, the soci-
ety as a whole (which includes the persons who have been
made slaves) would be poor. Society's wealth would be eaten
up to a great extent by "agency costs." Arguably, this, rather
than moral progress unrelated to material conditions, may be
the main reason that slavery is no longer a common
institution.
I recognize that some will count it a very great defect of
my ethical system that it does not condemn slavery as always
and everywhere bad. But partly, this is just a reaction to a
word that has intensely pejorative connotations. Is it "slav-
ery" to make a prison inmate work? Was indentured servi-
tude, whereby immigrants to this country in the colonial pe-
riod got their passage paid in exchange for becoming
indentured servants for a period of years, "slavery," and
therefore, bad? Was it an advance or retreat of civilization
when victorious tribes began enslaving rather than killing the
male population of the vanquished group? The answers are
not so clear as to justify a blanket condemnation of all forms
of involuntary servitude.
With natural resources, the initial assignment of prop-
erty rights is not critical because presumably whoever gets
the rights will sell or rent them to those who can get the most
value out of them. The problem of the discrepancy between
offer and asking prices will not be important here, because
resources whose only use is "utilitarian" in the lay sense will
tend to be valued at very near the market price. But this
happy picture ignores important sources of friction. In partic-
ular, those who in the initial distribution receive no rights in
natural resources will, in order to buy from those who do,
have to borrow against inherently uncertain prospects. The
same uncertainty makes it hard for the society to assign the
property rights at the outset to those who can get the most
value from them. Perhaps the best that can be done is, as in
the nineteenth-century Homestead Acts, to parcel out the
rights in an egalitarian fashion. This will give everyone some
physical capital and therefore make it easier for the able and
ambitious to rise.
An important application of this point suggests that the
implications of wealth maximization are not entirely "illib-
eral," as those who deride it as capitalist ethics-which it
is-may think. The maximization of wealth requires that
people with productive potential have opportunities to de-
[Vol. 2
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velop that potential. This in turn requires means to identify
such people and enable them to rent the tools they need to
realize their potential. Because the potential of young chil-
dren is not apparent unless they are given educational oppor-
tunities, and because it is difficult to borrow against one's fu-
ture earnings (because the loan can be enforced only by
making the borrower the lender's slave if he de-
faults-creating all the agency-cost problems of slavery),
there is a solid argument based on wealth maximization for
subsidizing education, especially (though not only) for the
poor. The argument, however, need not imply government
operation as distinct from financial support of the schools.
After rights are assigned, the free market can be relied
on to reallocate them from time to time to those who value
them the most as shown by willingness to pay an offer price
equal to the current owner's asking price. Problems of mo-
nopoly, the needs of public finance, the problem just dis-
cussed of financing investments in human capital, external
benefits. and costs associated with such phenomena as charity
(a source of external benefits) and crime (external costs), and
concerns with political stability will require, however, some
redistribution through the tax and government expenditure
system. In short, a lightly regulated capitalism starting from
conditions of broad equality will maximize a society's wealth.
The history of this country, and, more generally, a compari-
son of capitalist and noncapitalist societies, illustrate the ben-
efits of light regulation though it is no longer possible to de-
scribe our capitalism as lightly regulated.
B. The Instrumental Character of Wealth Maximization
I am reasonably satisfied that the objection based on the
fact that wealth cannot even be measured unless property
rights are first assigned can be met to the degree required in
ethical discourse. I now move on to a second and more seri-
ous objection, which is that the ethic of wealth maximization
rests on air. One does not value wealth for itself but for
something else, and once we identify the something else, we
can orient our social institutions toward accomplishing that
end and cease pursuing the merely instrumental goal of maxi-
mizing wealth.
The values which provide the underlying ethical appeal
of wealth maximization pull us in two seemingly opposite di-
rections: toward utilitarianism and toward individualism.
Wealth maximization promotes prosperity, and prosperity
19851
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(not always but usually) engenders happiness. Wealth max-
imization also protects individual rights, and therefore pro-
motes individualism. But, presumably, wealth maximization
promotes each of these desiderata (particularly the second) to
a lesser extent than a philosophy aimed directly at either one
of them would do-a point that will now be illustrated and
evaluated.
1. Wealth and Happiness
It is easy to think of examples where wealth maximiza-
tion is at least superficially opposed to utilitarian
goals-though, as the examples are rather extreme, maybe
they should not trouble us much. But set aside that point and
suppose as an example that a quantity of pituitary extract is
being auctioned off. There are two bidders: one is a poor
family whose child will be a dwarf unless he gets the extract;
the other is a wealthy dilettante who wants to use the extract
to grow a giant gerbil. The dilettante is the high bidder (let
us assume away any imperfection in capital markets by sup-
posing that even if the family could borrow against the child's
future earnings, its offer price would still be lower than the
dilettante's).
The result of wealth maximization in this case seems
clearly contrary to the dictates of utilitarianism, besides being
quite offensive. Yet these reactions may be superficial. We
must consider, for example, who will get the pituitary extract
if the dilettante is forbidden to buy it. More important, we
must consider that, in the long run, there may be more and
cheaper pituitary extract, and fewer dwarves, if the society
does not try to allocate the product to those who will derive
the greatest happiness from it. Or people may be sufficiently
altruistic, even toward strangers, to support, as a component
of the government's tax and expenditure system, a program
for buying pituitary extract at market prices and giving it to
children whose families are unable to afford it. Reliance on
private charity may seem an obvious alternative to a public
program but might not be efficient because of a free-rider
problem. If I want fewer dwarves, I will benefit from your
charitable contribution as much as you do, without having to
make a contribution myself. The result will be a lower level
of contributions than most people desire and, in the absence
of free-rider problems, would make. This is an inefficient re-
sult which, in principle anyway, justifies government inter-
vention even in a society dedicated to wealth maximization.
[Vol. 2
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The real divergence between wealth maximization and
utilitarianism occurs where utilitarianism is contrary to virtu-
ally everyone's moral intuitions. Suppose someone has such a
well-developed sense of pleasure that he receives twice as
much pleasure from a dollar than one who happens to be fru-
gal and self-denying. Is that a reason for transferring a dollar
from the second to the first person? A utilitarian would have
to say it was a reason, although it might well be outweighed
by the adverse effect on happiness in general if people's
wealth were up for grabs in this way. Even worse, suppose a
sadist got more pleasure from hurting people than his (invol-
untary) victims suffered pain; the sadist's conduct would be
happiness-maximizing, and therefore good.
Utilitarianism makes the individual an input into the
achievement of an aggregate quantity, the total happiness in
society. This fact is the dark side of the most attractive fea-
ture of utilitarianism-its tolerance for different conceptions
of the good. Somehow utilitarianism manages to be both rad-
ically individualistic and shockingly communitarian. It is so
individualistic in its premises that it gives the same status to
the sadist and the pleasure-loving scamp, on the one hand, as
to the heroic physician or brilliant engineer on the other. At
the same time, it is so aggregative that it invites us to con-
sider the possibility of redistributing wealth and power from
the productive and hard-working and self-restrained to peo-
ple of unbridled appetites and vicious disposition.
What is missing from utilitarianism is any very direct
concern with the productive side of human activity; all the
focus is on the consuming, the appetitive. Perhaps this mat-
ters little in practice, because consumption is dependent on
production, and the pleasure-loving will have few pleasures in
a society that does not give its members incentives to pro-
duce. Indeed, the pleasure-loving might work particularly
hard in order to get control of the resources that they need
in order to maximize their pleasure and might support insti-
tutions that reward productive people. Nonetheless, it seems
odd to give consumption moral precedence over production,
to sacrifice the frugal for the pleasure-loving.
Wealth maximization reverses the order, and this is a
mark in its favor. In a society dedicated to wealth maximiza-
tion, the power to consume is limited by the ability to obtain
claims on resources, and this ability depends on the produc-
tion of goods or services that others value in trade. This is
true even when the consumer is spending inherited money, as
might have been the case with our wealthy dilettante buying
19851
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pituitary extract for his gerbil. A person who accumulates
more money than he spends during his lifetime is, in effect,
deferring some of his spending until after his death, when it
will be done by surrogates, his heirs. In deciding how much
to accumulate and how much of that accumulation will go to
his heirs rather than to charity, the testator will take into ac-
count the likelihood that his heirs will spend the money he
leaves them in foolish or offensive ways. If, after taking this
possibility (a form of "agency cost") into account, he never-
theless leaves them money, they become, in effect, his agents
to spend it after his death. Any interference with their ex-
penditures is an interference with his disposition of assets ac-
cumulated through his productive efforts.
Granted, he may not have accumulated his wealth by
productive efforts; he may have stolen the money, or ob-
tained it by monopolization, or inherited it from someone
who had stolen it. These would be grounds for interfering
with its expenditure in the next generation according to the
testator's wishes. But if all illegitimate (i.e., unproductive)
sources of wealth are assumed away as incompatible with
wealth maximization, then in a society dedicated to wealth
maximization, the right to consume will depend on produc-
tive activity.
To defend wealth maximization rigorously, it would of
course be necessary to assign some ethical value to productiv-
ity. That would not be difficult but will not be attempted
here. Although there is some well-merited skepticism about
various aspects of modern life, very few people who live in
wealthy societies would like to live in poor ones; and very
many people who live in poor ones would, if allowed, move to
wealthy ones. So there seems to be something good in a prac-
tical sense about wealthy societies, unless you think (as few
economists do).that wealthy societies have become wealthy by
exploiting poor ones. And if there is something good about
wealthy societies, there must be something good about the
people who make societies wealthy-and they are not the he-
donists and the sybarites but the frugal and the hard-work-
ing. It is curious, but true, that to aim directly at maximizing
happiness, by distributing and redistributing wealth to those
who would get the most pleasure from it, is self-defeating be-
cause it results in a poor and unhappy society. Wealth max-
imization is a more effective instrument for attaining the
goals of utilitarianism than utilitarianism itself. Stated other-
wise, wealth maximization is the correct rule of decision in a
system of rule utilitarianism.
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Wealth maximization does not completely exclude gov-
ernmental redistributions of wealth, as we saw in discussing
the free-rider problem that depresses private charity. But it
authorizes only those redistributions that conform to the al-
truistic feelings that most people harbor or that otherwise
serve the interests of the productive people in the society.
The free-wheeling redistributions of a utilitarian society are
ruled out. This is also a mark in favor of wealth
maximization.
A further criticism of wealth maximization that I will
merely note and not try to answer is that, like utilitarianism,
it assigns too much weight to individual preferences. Com-
pare the sadist who assaults an involuntary victim and a sadist
who obtains equivalent satisfaction from a mutually voluntary
transaction with a masochist. The two sadists have similar
standing in a system unflinchingly dedicated to maximizing
happiness, provided that in the first case the sadist's pleasure
exceeds his victim's suffering; but in a system of wealth max-
imization, the second sadist is a distinctly better man. The
successful producer of an infantile television show who earns
$500,000 a year would, in a system of wealth maximization,
be counted as a better, more productive person than a la-
borer who earns $10,000. But the producer may not be more
productive than a scientist who earns only $50,000, as the sci-
entist may confer large external benefits on society, that is,
benefits that he does not capture in a higher income for
himself.
2. Wealth and Individual Rights
If wealth maximization has affinities with utilitarianism,
it also has affinities with the individualist political philosophy
that has been made respectable among professional philoso-
phers in recent years through the work of Robert
Nozick-though it has antecedents in the writings of Hobbes,
Locke, Kant, Jefferson, and other classic expositors of West-
ern liberalism. The premise of individualist political philoso-
phy is that a person is defined by the possession of faculties
such as reason and of rights thought appurtenant to the pos-
session of such faculties. The conclusion is that the role of
the state is to protect those rights, including the right to en-
gage in voluntary exchange. In wanting to protect voluntary
exchange, the individualist philosopher comes close to being
a wealth maximizer. But he may also deduce rights that may
be inconsistent with wealth maximization, as in Professor Ep-
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stein's suggestion that individualism implies that tort liability
to strangers should be strict liability, even if negligence liabil-
ity (or no liability) would be more efficient. In Epstein's view,
if you run someone down, you must pay his damages because
you have invaded his rights, even if you were faultless in the
sense of being unable to avoid the accident at reasonable,
perhaps at any, cost.
14
A counterargument is possible, however. 5 If negligence
is really cheaper than strict liability, then the sum of accident
(first-party) and liability (third-party) insurance costs will be
less under negligence than strict liability, and all drivers will
prefer the former. Hence, negligence liability can be derived
by a hypothetical voluntary transaction, which is a standard
method of justifying institutions in an individualist philoso-
phy. Stated differently, if a change (say from strict liability,
assuming that is the regime initially deduced from individual-
ist premises, to negligence liability) makes everyone better off
by his own rights, it is hard to see it as trammeling anyone's
individual rights. And if we are reasonably confident that the
change would be adopted unanimously if we could somehow
put it to a vote, this ought to come close enough to real (ex-
pressed) unanimity to satisfy the claims of individualism-as
should also, I would contend, near unanimity, provided that
the sacrifice by the opponents is a very small one in both an
aggregate and an individual sense. That is, if ninety-five per-
cent of drivers would have much lower insurance rates from
a switch to a negligence standard, and none of the other five
percent would pay more than a few dollars a year in addi-
tional premiums, it would be hard to condemn the change on
individualist grounds without being accused of fanaticism.
C. The Problem of Inalienable Rights
Some implications of individualism, however, are quite
hard to reconcile with wealth maximization, and these de-
serve separate consideration. Almost everyone writing in the
individualist tradition thinks slavery improper even if the
slave became such through a voluntary transaction, as in con-
tracts of indentured servitude, which, as I mentioned, were
common in eighteenth-century America-though most indi-
vidualists will make a narrow and partial exception for mili-
14. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973).
15. For a slightly fuller treatment of this point, see R. POSNER, supra
note 1, at 94-99.
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tary service. Torture and lynching are other examples where
the individualist will be inclined to say that the practice vio-
lates essential personhood even if it could be shown to maxi-
mize wealth, as it could be in the (far-fetched) example where
a person is lynched in circumstances of absolute certainty that
he is guilty and that the legal punishment would have been
death if he had stood trial. In this case, the only effect of
lynching is to reduce the costs of administering the legal sys-
tem. A somewhat more plausible case is eliminating the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, to make everyone (or nearly
everyone) better off ex ante, by increasing the probability of
convicting guilty people. The feeling against these practices
runs very deep in our culture. It is bound up with a general
aversion to cruelty that dates only from the humanitarian
movement of the nineteenth century; yet Hobbes, who em-
phatically supported the privilege against self-incrimination,"6
was a man of the seventeenth century-and no softy.
Long after lynching, slavery, and torture were all thor-
oughly reprobated, it still would not have been thought un-
just for the state to allow a man to starve who could not earn
a subsistence income by his best efforts. Today it would be
thought unjust, though not by all individualist philosophers
in the sense in which I am using the term. There is for good
or ill nothing in the ethic of wealth maximization which says
that society has a duty to help the needy. It has a duty not to
hurt them, to leave them alone; but it has no duty, and in a
strict ethic of wealth maximization no right, to force the pro-
ductive people to support the unproductive. Being needy
does not establish a claim. A right implies a duty; and there is
no basis in a system of wealth maximization for implying a
duty to help someone you have not hurt. Charity is an impor-
tant part of personal ethics, but except where the charitable
impulse is impeded by free-rider problems, a political duty of
charity cannot be deduced from the premises of wealth max-
imization. In this regard, wealth maximization is at one with
individualist political philosophy, but both are out of phase
with powerful currents of contemporary moral feeling; both,
perhaps, neglect the role of luck in wealth and poverty and
by doing so give excessive moral status to the condition of
being a productive person.
All of the examples I have discussed are sufficiently
troublesome to make me regard wealth maximization as an
incomplete guide to social decision-making. But within the
16. See, T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt. 2, ch. 21 (London 1651).
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broad limits indicated by these examples, wealth maximiza-
tion does provide a reasonable guide to social decision-mak-
ing and, in particular, builds a bridge between utilitarian and
individualist philosophies-and not an adventitious bridge,
either. Wealth maximization shares with utilitarianism an em-
phasis on the moral value of individual preferences and
desires, and with individualism a hostility to coercion.17 It
does not banish coercion entirely, because where market
transaction costs are prohibitive, wealth maximization allows,
and indeed requires, the state to use its powers to mimic the
market-if this can be done at a cost lower than the gain in
value brought about by the market-mimicking transaction.
But the limited forms of coercion that are legitimate in a sys-
tem of wealth maximization promote social welfare so
broadly that they can be deemed to command almost univer-
sal consent. The institutions of criminal, property, tort, and
contract law-indeed of common law in general-are of this
character.
The strong hold that both utilitarianism and individual-
ism have over American social thought suggests that a politi-
cal philosophy which draws on both may command a broader
support than either. The pluralistic and-let us face
it-materialistic character of our civilization makes it inevita-
ble that government will and should try to promote the
greatest happiness of the greatest number, rather than decide
what preferences are legitimate and whose preferences
should count the most. But pushed to an extreme, utilitarian-
ism creates a potential for wealth redistribution that is incon-
sistent with a commitment to individual autonomy (as illus-
trated by the claims of the "utility monster" to have wealth
redistributed to him because he is especially efficient at
processing it into happiness, though only his own). Yet too
rigid a commitment to individual autonomy would diminish
the happiness of the society to an intolerable extent-a point
with many potential illustrations from the writings of Kant
and his followers, including Rawls, who to maximize the posi-
tion of the least fortunate would be willing to impose enor-
mous sacrifices on the rest of the society."
17. The civilizing influence of capitalism-and what is wealth max-
imization but the ethics of capitalism?-is emphasized in Haskell, Capitalism
and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility (pts. 1 & 2), 90 AM. HIST. REV.
339, 547 (1985).
18. See, e.g, J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152-54 (1971); Arrow,
Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245,
251 (1973); Hodges, Punishment, 18 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
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Wealth maximization perhaps comes up short by not rec-
ognizing either inalienable (i.e., nonsalable) rights-a defi-
ciency (if it is a deficiency) that it shares with utilitarian-
ism-or claims to public assistance-a deficiency, in terms of
contemporary intuitive morality, that it shares with individu-
alism. In a system of wealth maximization, the needy (dra-
matically including the child in my pituitary-extract example)
have no right to coerce even minimum assistance. Yet this
characterization of wealth maximization is only approxi-
mately true. It would be more accurate to say that wealth
maximization reflects the distributive preferences of the peo-
ple who produce the wealth of the society. To the extent that
such people are altruistic, but the full expression of their al-
truism is frustrated by free-rider problems, government is au-
thorized (indeed, required) to undertake redistributive ef-
forts. If altruistic feelings were not widespread, philosophers
would not consider a political philosophy that made no room
for the hard-hearted rather than hard-headed. To the wealth
maximizer, altruism is neither good nor bad; but given that it
exists, there is a legitimate if limited role for public wealth
redistribution. If altruism did not exist, the absence of such
redistribution would not be felt to be unjust.
It must also be emphasized that it is a political philosophy
that I am expounding. You may be a bad person if you are
selfish; but it may not be the proper role of the state to
change your values and preferences.
III. APPLICATION TO LAW
Despite all I have said, or perhaps because of some of
what I have said, I am sure that many of my readers will con-
tinue to regard wealth maximization as a dubious guide to
social decision-making in general. But the case for using it to
guide courts, in areas where the Constitution or legislation
does not deprive them of initiative or discretion in the mat-
ter, is a powerful one-though with some limitations along
the lines suggested above.
The legal profession long pretended that with unimpor-
tant exceptions, discretion-power-was something that bad
judges seized, while good judges deduced the outcomes of
their cases from rules laid down by higher or prior courts,
legislatures, and the framers of the Constitution. Today,
however, it is generally recognized that even the best judges
209 (1957-1959).
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cannot decide difficult cases simply by deduction from prem-
ises found in authoritative sources of legal guidance (which is
why the cases are called difficult)-that they have and must
exercise substantial discretion. The question arises, in what
frame of reference should that discretion be exercised? Prag-
matic? Utilitarian? Christian? Darwinian? Rawlsian? Nozick-
ian? I suggest that wealth maximization provides the most ac-
ceptable frame of reference. I shall not attempt to argue this
position fully here but will content myself with the following
rather summary points:
1. Wealth maximization combines, as I have said, ele-
ments of utilitarianism and individualism, and in so doing
comes closer to being a consensus political philosophy (I do
not suggest it is one) in our contentiously pluralistic society
than any other overarching political principle. This point is
concealed by the fact that the term "wealth maximization" is
not a term in common usage. It would be easy to show, how-
ever, that many invocations of fairness and justice, "balanc-
ing" and due process and other familiar principles or meth-
ods of judicial decision-making are proxies for wealth
maximization.19
2. The principal complaint likely to be leveled against
wealth maximization as a guide to judicial action is its lack of
a strong redistributive component; as we have seen, it vali-
dates some redistribution of wealth from rich to poor but
much less than, is desired by many reflective and influential
students of social justice. Any possible collisions between
wealth maximization and the strong modern feelings against
slavery, lynching, and torture, however, are made moot by
the constitutional prohibitions against these practices.20
Given the absence of anything approaching a consensus
on the optimum distribution of wealth, however, it is very
hard to see how courts could adopt a redistributive ethic to
guide their decisions. For this and another reason-that
courts do not have flexible instruments for redistribution
compared to the (overtly) taxing, spending, and regulatory
branches of government-a sensible division of labor has the
19. This is a major theme of my book, R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); the forthcoming third edition will be published in
March, 1986.
20. The Thirteenth Amendment forbids slavery; the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments lynching; the Fifth
Amendment torture to obtain incriminating evidence; and the Eighth




courts focus on wealth maximization (making the pie as big as
possible) while legislatures focus on redistributing some of
that wealth (reslicing the pie).
My interest in wealth maximization grew from and re-
mains centered upon its role, both actual and desirable, in
guiding judicial decision-making in "common law" areas,
broadly defined to include any field where judge-made law is
important; where judicial discretion-lawful and legitimate
judicial discretion-is important. By a happy coincidence, as
I have said, many of the questions on which the unflinching
embrace of the implications of wealth maximization might
yield results contrary to widespread moral intuitions, such as
lynching and torture, have been taken out of the area of judi-
cial discretion by constitutional provisions. The domain in
which wealth maximization is allowed to operate in the law is,
not surprisingly, the domain in which the principle of wealth
maximization-once it is correctly understood, and not con-
fused with the ethics of Mammon or Midas-expresses fun-
damental values of our political culture.
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